Antinatalism

Lore & Background

Antinatalist sentiments have existed for thousands of years. Early formulations appear in ancient Greece, such as in Sophocles's Oedipus at Colonus, which states that not to be born is best.

Reader's Guide

Antinatalism is distinguished from antinatalist population policies, which do not necessarily imply that coming into existence is a universal harm. Masahiro Morioka defines it as 'the thought that all human beings or all sentient beings should not be born.' The most prominent argument is Benatar's asymmetry argument, which posits an axiological asymmetry between good and bad things in life, such that coming into existence is always a harm. Robbert Zandbergen distinguishes between reactionary (activist) antinatalism, which seeks to limit reproduction locally or temporarily, and philosophical antinatalism, which seeks to end it conclusively. A taxonomy divides antiprocreative thought into childfreeness, VHEMT, efilism, and philosophical antinatalism itself, with only the latter meeting the definition of philosophical antinatalism.

Did You Know?

• Sophocles's Oedipus at Colonus contains an early antinatalist sentiment: 'Not to be born is, beyond all estimation, best.'
• Arthur Schopenhauer questioned whether the human race would continue if procreation were a matter of pure rational reflection.
• Some antinatalists consider coming into existence a serious harm for all sentient beings, not just humans.

Core Definition and Philosophical Scope

Antinatalism is a philosophical stance that judges procreation to be ethically impermissible or morally indefensible. At its heart, the position holds that people ought to refrain from bringing new children into the world. A defining feature is that some adherents regard the very fact of entering existence as a profound and inescapable harm to the individual who comes to be. Crucially, the scope of antinatalist thought is not confined to human reproduction alone. Many proponents extend their reasoning to all sentient creatures, maintaining that entering existence constitutes a grave harm for any being capable of experience. This universalist dimension sets philosophical antinatalism apart from narrower ethical positions that concern only human bioethics. The stance is fundamentally a moral claim about the permissibility of creating new conscious life, rather than a policy prescription or a demographic argument. It sits within the broader landscape of value judgments about existence, suffering, and consent, drawing on ethical reasoning about harm, autonomy, and the asymmetry between positive and negative experiences in life.

The Central Arguments

Several ethical lines of reasoning underpin antinatalist thought. The most frequently cited argument concerns the imposition of risk: by creating a new person, a parent subjects that individual to the possibility of serious harm without that person's consent. A second pillar addresses inevitable suffering—death being the most universal example—that every new life will encounter regardless of how well it is treated, and which no one can consent to before existing. A third strand highlights the indirect harms any human being inflicts on other people, animals, and the environment simply by existing and consuming resources. Perhaps the most philosophically prominent formulation is what is known as Benatar's asymmetry argument, advanced by South African philosopher David Benatar. This argument posits an axiological asymmetry: the absence of pleasure is not a harm to anyone, while the presence of suffering is a harm to someone. Because coming into existence guarantees the latter while merely forgoing the former, Benatar concludes that bringing a new person into being is always a net harm. This asymmetry framework has become a cornerstone of scholarly antinatalist discourse.

Ancient and Early Modern Voices

Antinatalist sentiment stretches back millennia. In ancient Greece, Sophocles captured the idea in Oedipus at Colonus, composed shortly before his death in 406 BC. The play's famous passage declares that not being born is the greatest good, and that the swiftest return to non-existence is the next best fate, cataloguing envy, strife, battle, murder, and the miseries of old age as the inevitable lot of the living. In the Islamic world, the Arab philosopher al-Ma'arri wove antinatalist reflections throughout his life, including in an elegy for a lost relative. His self-composed epitaph on his tomb strikingly framed birth as "my father's crime against me, which I myself committed against none." In nineteenth-century France, Gustave Flaubert wrote in a 1846 letter that the prospect of fatherhood filled him with horror and that he would curse himself if he ever became a parent. Arthur Schopenhauer, in his 1851 work Parerga and Paralipomena, urged readers to imagine procreation stripped of pleasure and reduced to pure rational reflection, asking whether anyone would then coldly impose existence on a coming generation.

Taxonomy, Etymology, and Distinctions

The term "antinatalism" was likely first used in print by Théophile de Giraud in his 2006 manifesto L'art de guillotiner les procréateurs. Masahiro Morioka defines the position as the conviction that no human being, and indeed no sentient being whatsoever, ought to be brought into existence. A useful taxonomy divides broader "antiprocreative" thought into four branches: childfreeness, the Voluntary Human Extinction Movement, efilism (which advocates extreme pro-death stances and forced extinction), and philosophical antinatalism proper. Only the last qualifies as antinatalism in the strict philosophical sense, while the other three merely oppose a supposed duty to reproduce. Robbert Zandbergen further distinguishes between "reactionary" or activist antinatalism, which seeks to limit reproduction locally or temporarily, and the more originary philosophical form, which aims to end procreation conclusively. Crucially, antinatalism as a philosophical concept must be separated from antinatalist population policies adopted by certain governments. Such governmental measures are demographic tools and do not necessarily rest on the premise that existence itself is a universal harm to the individual brought into being.