Divine command theory

Divine command theory, also called theological voluntarism, is a meta-ethical view holding that an action is morally good if and only if God commands it. Morality, according to this theory, is set by divine orders, and being moral means obeying those orders. Both ancient and modern followers of monotheistic and polytheistic faiths have frequently recognized the role of God’s commands in grounding morality.

The theory has many versions. Historical thinkers like Saint Augustine, Duns Scotus, William of Ockham, and Søren Kierkegaard each offered their own take. More recently, Robert Merrihew Adams proposed a modified version based on God’s omnibenevolence, linking morality to human ideas of right and wrong. Paul Copan has defended the theory from a Christian perspective, while Linda Trinkaus Zagzebski’s divine motivation theory suggests that God’s motivations, not his commands, are the source of moral value.

Critics have raised semantic objections. Philosopher William Wainwright argued that “commanded by God” and “morally obligatory” do not mean the same thing, which he thought makes defining obligation tricky. He also claimed that since the theory requires knowledge of God for morality, atheists and agnostics could not be moral—a major weakness. Others challenge the theory on modal grounds: even if God’s commands and morality align in this world, they might not in other possible worlds. The Euthyphro dilemma, first posed by Plato in a polytheistic context, threatens either to make morality arbitrary or to make God irrelevant to it. Additional criticisms include the theory’s apparent conflict with God’s omnibenevolence, moral autonomy, and religious pluralism, though some scholars have defended it against these charges.

In its general form, “divine command” is the standard term, but God communicates in various ways. Scholastics identified five forms of God’s revealed will, summarized in a Latin hexameter: “Praecipit et prohibet, permittit, consultit, implet.” *Praecipit* means giving precepts—telling people to do something, including warnings or exhortations. *Prohibet* means prohibiting—commanding not to do something. *Permittit* means permitting—not a command, since a person may either do or not do the thing. *Consultit* means counselling—advice, instruction, or invitation, distinct from commands because commands generate obligation and often carry an expectation of condemnation if disobeyed. *Implet* means fulfilling—directly effective commands that do not require language-using recipients, like “Let there be light.” Sometimes “command” refers to the whole family of speech acts, but sometimes only to those that create obligation.

Philosophers such as Augustine, Duns Scotus, William of Ockham, and John Calvin have presented various forms of the theory. It generally teaches that moral truth does not exist apart from God, and divine commands determine morality. Stronger versions hold that God’s command is the sole reason a good action is moral; weaker versions see divine command as a key part of a larger reason. The theory asserts that good actions are morally good because of divine command, and many religious believers accept some form of it. Adherents believe moral obligation means obeying God’s commands; what is morally right is what God desires.

Divine command theory appears in the ethics of many contemporary religions—Judaism, Islam, the Bahá’í Faith, and Christianity—as well as in polytheistic traditions. In ancient Athens, citizens often tied moral truth directly to divine commands, making piety nearly equivalent to morality. While Christianity does not require divine command theory, people often associate the two. The theory can seem plausible to Christians because the traditional view of God as creator of the universe parallels the idea that he creates moral truths. It is also supported by the Christian belief that God is all-powerful, implying that he creates moral truths rather than discovering them independently—something that would seem inconsistent with his omnipotence.

Augustine offered a version of divine command theory that began by framing ethics as the pursuit of the supreme good, which brings human happiness. He argued that to achieve this happiness, humans must love objects worthy of love in the right way; this requires loving God, which then allows them to love other things correctly. His ethics held that loving God properly orients human loves, leading to fulfilment. Augustine agreed with Plato that a well-ordered soul is a desirable outcome of morality, but unlike Plato, he believed this had a higher purpose: living according to God’s commands. His morality was thus heteronomous, relying on deference to a higher authority (God) rather than acting autonomously.